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Summary 
Recent claims that the Christian tradition justifies destructive research on human 
embryos have drawn upon an article by the late Professor Gordon Dunstan which 
appeared in this journal in 1984.  Despite its undoubted influence, this article was 
flawed and seriously misrepresented the tradition of Christian reflection on the moral 
status of the human embryo.  
 
Recent mistaken claims concerning the Christian tradition  
 
In January 2001, the Anglican Bishop of Oxford claimed that destructive embryo 
research was consistent with traditional Christian thinking on the moral status of the 
embryo:  
 
I should like to suggest that it was only in the 19th century that the [Roman 
Catholic] position became firmed up.  Earlier Christian thought on this 
subject indicates an awareness of a developing reality, with developing rights 
as we would put it.[1] 
 
The Bishop was subsequently appointed Chair of the House of Lords Select 
Committee on Stem Cell Research, which conducted the most significant 
parliamentary review of embryo experimentation since the Warnock committee which 
reported in 1984.   
 
The Bishop’s argument was based on an article by Professor Gordon Dunstan.  This 
article was written as a submission to the Warnock committee and was published in 
1984 in this journal.[2]  Dunstan asserted: 
 
The claim to absolute protection for the human embryo ‘from the beginning’ 
is a novelty in the Western, Christian and specifically Roman Catholic moral 
traditions.  It is virtually a creation of the later nineteenth century, a little over 
a century ago; and that is a novelty indeed as traditions go.[3] 
 
The article also influenced the Anglican Primate of Australia, who published a 
defence of embryo research in April 2002.[4]  Dunstan’s article continues to feature in 
the stem cell debate, being recommended, for example, on the website of The 
International Society for Stem Cell Research.[5]   
 
There are many arguments at play in the contemporary debate over the ethics of 
embryonic stem cell research.  The aim of the present paper is to focus on the 
particular argument presented by Dunstan in his 1984 article and reiterated in 
1988.[6]  This paper will argue that Dunstan’s article is flawed and misleading.   
 
The “catena of evidences”[7] 
 
Dunstan draws on a range of sources spanning three thousand years of moral 
reflection.  These include two greatly respected works of Catholic scholarship,[8] five 
ancient near eastern law codes,[9] two ancient embryologists,[10] four representatives 
of the early Church,[11] three Celtic penitentials,[12] three English lawyers,[13] one 
Tudor physician,[14] the greatest of all medieval poets,[15] five Catholic moral 
theologians,[16] and no fewer than five popes.[17] 
 
These writers are said to reflect a single coherent moral tradition that “attempted to 
grade the protection accorded to the nascent human being according to the stages of 
its development”.  The article presents Pius IX as the one who effectively abandoned 
the tradition when, in 1869, he extended the penalty of excommunication to all 
abortions “without distinction… as to the gestational age of the fetus”.  
 
Dunstan acknowledges three “apparent dissentients” to the tradition he claimed was 
dominant: Tertullian, who is discounted with relative ease as he was “by no means 
accounted orthodox”; Basil the Great, whose weight is counterbalanced by that of his 
own brother, Gregory of Nyssa; and Pope Sixtus V who in 1588 “summarily 
abolished the tradition” only for it to be reaffirmed in 1591 by “the next pope, Pius 
IX”.[18]  Having considered these three alleged exceptions, Dunstan confidently 
claims that the tradition according the embryo the moral status of a human being from 
the beginning of its development is “virtually a creation of the later nineteenth 
century”.  
 
At first glance, Dunstan appears to have produced a persuasive case that the Christian 
tradition has only relatively recently accorded absolute respect to the early embryo.  
However, his case is much weaker than it first appears.  Dunstan omits important 
authorities, relies on flawed sources, and fails to distinguish between divergent 
categories. 
 
Troubling omissions 
 
Professor Dunstan describes Tertullian as a “dissentient” for his view that “to deny 
birth is to hasten homicide”[19] but he omits to cite any other figure from the first 
three centuries of Christianity to show that Tertullian’s view was unorthodox.  In fact, 
the first generations of Christians, as represented by The Didache, The letter of 
Barnabas, Athenagoras and Municius Felix, universally characterised abortion as 
homicide.[20]  Their extension of care to the youngest and weakest was in conscious 
opposition to the prevalent pagan acceptance of abortion and infanticide.[21]  Far 
from adopting a “graded” view, all witnesses to the early Christian tradition reject 
abortion without distinction as to stage of development of the embryo. 
 
Basil the Great is also described as a “dissentient”, but again Dunstan omits 
consideration of the particular tradition to which he belongs.  Basil was the first 
Christian canonist to consider a distinction between the “formed” and the “unformed” 
embryo and, as Dunstan acknowledges, Basil decisively rejected it.  In this he was 
wholly in conformity with dominant tradition of church legislation in the first 
millennium (Elvira (305); Ancyra (314); Basil (375); Lerida (524); Braga (527); 
Trullo (692); Mainz (847)), which treated abortion as homicide without distinction as 
to the stage of development of the embryo.[22]   
 
The article contrasts Basil’s view with that of his brother, Gregory of Nyssa who once 
asserted that it is “not… possible to style the unformed embryo a human being, but 
only a potential one”.[23]  However, this quotation does not refer to a gradation 
within pregnancy between the formed and unformed embryo but to a distinction 
between the born and the unborn child.  It is from a highly polemical work in which 
Gregory’s characterisation of the unborn is distorted by his desire to criticise the 
unorthodox beliefs of some Christians in Macedonia.  He denied that these Christians 
were properly baptized and derided them as unformed and “unborn”.  Nevertheless, 
when Gregory addressed the subject directly, he argued that the unborn child 
possesses a spiritual soul from conception.[24]  Far from contradicting Basil’s view, 
Gregory’s account of ensoulment strengthens the case for treating abortion as 
homicide irrespective of the embryo’s stage of development.  
 
Professor Dunstan confesses that he “has not pursued the question” whether Basil’s 
judgement persisted in the Greek Churches.  This is a rather glaring omission.  In fact 
the Eastern Churches never embraced the “graded” view that Dunstan presents as the 
Christian tradition until the nineteenth century.   
 
Dunstan presents Pius IX in 1869 as breaking with received Christian tradition in a 
desperate attempt to oppose an alleged increase in abortion in the nineteenth century.  
What is omitted from this picture, among other things, is the revival in the West of the 
early Christian belief that the spiritual soul is infused at conception.  In the sixteenth 
century both Calvin and Luther came to believe that the soul is present in the embryo 
from conception.[25]  In 1621 this belief was advocated within the Catholic tradition 
by Paolo Zacchia, who was later appointed physician to Innocent X.[26]  The view 
that the soul is present from conception seemed to find further support in a series of 
scientific discoveries.  In 1672 egg follicles were observed under the microscope.  In 
1677 spermatozoa were observed in the semen.  Biologists in the modern era 
understand the development of the embryo as a continuous process with fertilization – 
the fusion of egg and sperm – marking the beginning of a new living being.  Dunstan 
fails to register these relevant advances in biological understanding and, significantly, 
he cites no medical authors between 1577 and the present.   
 
What Professor Dunstan represents as a “novelty” actually represents the earliest 
Christian tradition as maintained by the Churches of the East and as revived in the 
West during the Reformation. The re-emergence of the early Christian view within 
the Roman Catholic tradition was the result of the demise of ancient Greek biology in 
the wake of scientific discoveries in the seventeenth century.  The belief that the early 
embryo deserves the protection due to a human being can hardly, therefore, be 
dismissed as “virtually an invention of the late nineteenth century”.   
 
Flawed authorities  
 
As well as omitting significant portions of the tradition, Dunstan’s case is also flawed 
in that the authors he quotes with approval relied heavily upon ideas and authorities 
that are no longer credible.  For example, Dunstan emphasises the importance of a 
passage in one particular Greek translation of the Bible (the ‘Septuagint’ translation) 
which introduced the formed/unformed distinction into the Christian tradition: 
 
And if two men are fighting and strike a pregnant woman and her infant 
departs not fully formed, he shall be forced to pay a fine: according to 
whatever the woman’s husband shall lay upon him, he shall give with what is 
fitting. But if it is fully formed, he shall give life for life…  
(Exodus 21:22-23 from the Septuagint translation) 
 
However, Dunstan admits that this translation marks a “significant departure” from 
the original Hebrew of the passage.  The original Hebrew text contains no reference to 
formed or unformed, but distinguishes penalties according to whether the departure of 
the infant from the womb results in “serious harm”.  The Septuagint version of this 
passage is thus a mistranslation, shaped not by the underlying Hebrew but by what 
Dunstan acknowledges is “an outmoded” Greek embryology.[27] 
 
This unfortunate mistranslation had an extensive influence on later writers.  Dunstan 
quotes a passage from Augustine to the effect that killing an unformed embryo is not 
homicide: 
 
If what is brought forth is unformed but at this stage some sort of living, 
shapeless thing, then the law of homicide would not apply, for it could not be 
said that there was a living soul in that body, for it lacks sense, if it be such as 
is not yet formed and therefore not yet endowed with sense.[28] 
 
Nevertheless, Augustine’s attitude is more ambiguous than it might seem and this 
becomes evident if we examine this passage more closely.  This is made difficult 
because, unaccountably and without warning the reader, Dunstan has deleted a whole 
line from the middle of the passage.  After “living, shapeless thing” Augustine adds 
the qualification “since the great question of the soul is not to be rushed into rashly 
with a thoughtless opinion”.  This raises the issue of the origin of the soul, a question 
which Augustine discusses in many of his writings.  Augustine remained open to the 
view that the soul was generated by the parents, as this seemed to explain the 
inheritance of original sin.  This view implies that the soul is present from conception.  
By deleting the line Dunstan conceals the fact that Augustine’s account of the origin 
of soul is in tension with the rest of this passage.  Indeed, earlier in the article Dunstan 
explicitly acknowledges that the view that the soul is given by the parents, as 
Tertullian held, “add[s] importance to the early embryo”.[29] 
 
If Augustine is keen to resist the “rash” or “thoughtless” rejection of the presence of 
the soul in the early embryo, why does he state that abortion of an unformed embryo 
is not homicide?  He says this because he is constrained by a translation of Scripture 
which applies the punishment “life for life” only for abortion of a formed infant.  
Seeking some way of resolving this tension, Augustine suggests that, while the soul 
may be present in the unformed embryo, it would not yet be a “living soul” (anima 
viva) because it would not be endowed with sense.  This explanation is hardly 
satisfying.  If there is a soul in the unformed embryo then, even if it is dormant, it is 
surely alive.  Augustine struggles and fails to make sense of a text that we now know 
to be a mistranslation.  Apart from commenting on this one text he never suggested 
that the embryo was less than fully human.  In particular, he continued to think that 
the soul might be generated by the parents and, thus, might be present in the embryo 
from conception.[30] 
 
In the thirteenth century, the doctrine of “delayed ensoulment” became prevalent 
among Western Christians not only because of the Septuagint but also through the 
direct influence of the biological works of Aristotle.  Aristotle stated that the body 
was formed at forty days after conception for males and at ninety days for 
females.[31]  Many Christians inferred that ensoulment happened at this point.  One 
prominent example is Thomas Aquinas.  Dunstan provides six quotations where 
Aquinas affirms delayed ensoulment, of which three explicitly mention Aristotle.  
These references inevitably raise the question whether Aquinas’s conclusions were 
reliant upon Aristotle’s biology, and, if so, what weight can be given to them in a 
modern context.  For example, Aquinas took from Aristotle the belief that the embryo 
was shaped by the power of the male parent acting through vital spirits in the seed.  
 
The formation of the body is caused by the generative power, not of that 
which is generated [the embryo], but of the father generating from seed.[32] 
 
For Aquinas, the power of something follows from its nature.  If the power to develop 
into a man were inherent in the embryo then it would already possess a human nature.  
However, in the light of modern genetics, it is undeniable that the power of 
development is inherent in the embryo.  The embryo is shaped, not by the father 
acting at a distance, but by the embryo’s own genetic nature.  Thus, if we apply 
Aquinas’s principles to modern biology, it seems that the embryo must possess a 
human nature, and hence a human soul, from fertilisation. 
 
The “graded” view that Dunstan finds in Augustine and Aquinas can be traced 
directly to the regrettable influence of a mistranslation of Scripture and to an 
erroneous ancient biology.  Where significant thinkers from the past such as these 
relied on mistaken authorities we cannot give much credence to their particular 
conclusions.  However, we can still profit by considering their general method and 
approach in combining the best available scientific knowledge with enduring 
philosophical and ethical principles.  It is noteworthy that, even though they were 
influenced by the Septuagint and by Aristotle’s biology, other elements in the thought 
of Augustine and Aquinas suggest that the embryo possesses a spiritual soul from 
conception.[33][34][35] 
 
Confused distinctions  
 
A final flaw in Dunstan’s article is that it confuses different theological, legal and 
moral categories and, on the basis of this, supposes that various writers would support 
actions which in fact they explicitly rejected.  For example,  Dunstan cites an 
important legal decision of Innocent III which introduced the ensouled/not-ensouled 
distinction into Western canon law.  However, it is important to note that this decision 
was narrowly concerned with the technical question of irregularity: whether a monk 
whose actions inadvertently caused a miscarriage should be barred from becoming a 
cleric.  With respect to penance, early abortion was regarded as homicide.  This is 
made clear in a passage of Raymond de Penafort quoted in the article. 
 
If however [the embryo] is not ensouled, [abortion] is not said to be homicide 
so far as concerns irregularity, but it is accounted homicide in regard to 
penance.[36] 
 
Penance is the expression of sorrow for sin, and the level of penance expresses the 
moral seriousness of the sin.  Thus, in the middle ages, causing abortion was morally 
equated with homicide whatever the stage of development of the embryo.  Medieval 
Christians who believed that the unformed embryo was not yet a human being did not 
accord it the status of an irrational animal.  They saw the early embryo as an already 
living creature whom God was preparing to receive a spiritual soul.  This approach is 
evident, for example, in the writings of Bonaventure (d. 1274), who stated that 
destroying an embryo before ensoulment constitutes homicide, not according to the 
definition of homicide (ratione homicidii) but according to the malice of homicide 
(maleficii).[37]  Since the seventeenth century Catholic theologians have increasingly 
come to think that the soul is present from the beginning of development.  However, 
interestingly, even the most recent official teaching has shied away from defining this 
as a matter of doctrine.  Rather, what has been emphasised throughout Christian 
history is that the embryo should be treated as a person.[38] 
 
Dunstan asserts that in 1588, Pope Sixtus V “summarily abolished the tradition which 
attached culpability to the development of the fetus”.  However, as noted above, the 
tradition prior to this point did not invoke the stage of development of the embryo to 
determine the penance for abortion and hence its moral culpability.  It was Pope 
Gregory XIV in 1591 who introduced the relative novelty of using ensoulment to 
determine canonical penance on abortion, though he still maintained that abortion 
before this point was a grave sin.  When the law was amended by Pius IX in 1869, it 
was in fact brought closer to what it had been in the time of Raymond of Penaforte.   
 
It is essential to note that none of the canon-legal changes of the last thousand years 
invoked the stage of development to determine whether the embryo should be 
protected.  Deliberate and direct destruction of the embryo was always viewed as a 
grave offence.  Thus those elements from the tradition, identified by Dunstan, which 
support taking embryo destruction as a less serious crime than homicide nevertheless 
give no precedent for the approval, sanctioning or actively facilitating of embryo 
destruction.  As licensing destructive research on human embryos for the sake of 
medical progress involves just such positive approval it cannot be justified, or at least 
not on the basis of the Christian tradition. 
 
In summary,  
 
❑ The earliest Christian witnesses and the Churches of the East generally regard the 
destruction of the human embryo as homicide.  
❑ Belief in “delayed ensoulment” among medieval Western Christians was founded 
on a mistranslation of Scripture and on an outmoded embryology. 
❑ Even when delayed ensoulment was believed, Christians continued to extend 
moral and legal protection to the human embryo from the beginning.  
 
All the authorities cited by Professor Dunstan in favour of embryo research in fact 
regarded the deliberate destruction of the early embryo as homicide or as something at 
least analogous to homicide.  None sanctioned the intentional destruction of unborn 
lives at any state of development.  Dunstan’s thesis that the Christian tradition lends 
support to destructive research on early human embryos simply turns history on its 
head!  While it is regrettable that this fallacy has been uncritically restated by the 
Bishop of Oxford and by the Primate of Australia, it is encouraging to see it squarely 
contradicted by the Archbishop of Canterbury, among others.[39] 
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